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Sell-side analysts employ different benchmarks when defining their stock recommendations. For 
example, a ‘buy’ for some brokers means the stock is expected to outperform its peers in the same 
sector (“sector benchmarkers”), while for other brokers it means the stock is expected to 
outperform the market (“market benchmarkers”), or just some absolute return (“total 
benchmarkers”). We explore the validity and implications of the adoption of these different 
benchmarks. Analysis of the relation between analysts’ recommendations and their long-term 
growth and earnings forecasts suggests that analysts indeed abide by their benchmarks: Sector 
benchmarkers rely less on across-industry information, and focus more on ranking firms within 
their industries. We also find evidence that market- and sector-benchmarkers are successful in 
meeting or beating their benchmark returns, while total-benchmarkers are not. However, we do 
not find much evidence that investors react differently to recommendations based on the different 
benchmarks. The research carries implications for the correct understanding and interpretation of 
sell-side research and its investment value. 
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It is well known that sell-side research analysts publish investment advice on 
stocks in the forms of recommendations such as ‘buys,’ ‘holds,’ and ‘sells.’ However, not 
all buys/holds/sells are created equal. An inspection of the disclosures in which analysts 
describe the meaning of their recommendations reveals that different brokers assign 
different meanings to their recommendations. For example, in one broker a ‘buy’ might 
mean that the stock is expected to outperform its industry peers (we call this broker a 
“sector benchmarker”); in another a ‘buy’ might mean that the stock is expected to 
outperform the market (“market benchmarker”); and in yet another, a ‘buy’ might mean 
that the stock is expected earn a return that exceeds some pre-determined threshold such 
as 10% (“total benchmarker”). Thus, ‘buy’ recommendations from different brokers carry 
with them very different literal meanings and investment advice.1  
In this paper we explore the validity and implications of brokers’ reliance on 
different benchmarks. We ask three questions. First, do analysts abide by their 
benchmarks? That is, we examine whether the benchmarks declared by analysts influence 
the way analysts incorporate fundamental information into their stock recommendations.  
Second, do the benchmarks affect the predictive value of analysts’ 
recommendations? We explore whether stock recommendations issued with respect to a 
particular benchmark achieve long-term performance that is consistent with the stated 
benchmark. The correct interpretation of analysts’ stock recommendations is of 
paramount importance. Accordingly, a large body of research attempts to assess the value 
of analysts’ recommendations. This literature examines whether following the 
recommendations of analysts yields future abnormal return (e.g., Stickel, 1995; Womack 
(1996), Barber, Lehavy, McNichols and Trueman, 2001 and 2006; Jegadeesh, Kim, 
Krische, and Lee, 2005). But the extant literature does not account for the fact that 
similarly named recommendation issued different brokers can carry different meanings. It 
is only natural to augment this literature by considering the predictive ability of the 
recommendation conditional on which benchmark is being used.  
                                                            
1 Unless otherwise noted, we use the term ‘buy’ to refer to optimistic recommendations, thus including both 
strong buy and buy recommendation levels, while ‘sell’ refers to recommendations with a pessimistic tone, 
thus including both sell and strong sell recommendations levels. 
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Finally, the different benchmarks used by analysts have implications for investors 
who need to interpret the investment advice in each recommendation. If investors 
internalize the different benchmarks used by different analysts they should respond 
differently to recommendations based on those benchmarks. Our third question, thus, is 
whether investors interpret and react to recommendations in a manner consistent with the 
stated benchmark.  
Beginning in September of 2002, and following Rule NASD 2711, Rule NYSE 
472, and the Global Settlement, brokers are required to define in each report the literal 
meaning of their recommendations, including the benchmark to be used when 
interpreting the recommendation advice. To examine our research questions we hand-
collect, mostly from full-text analyst reports, the meaning of recommendations for 173 
brokers accounting for over 94% of all recommendations issued during our sample period 
(September 2002-December 2009). We find that the most prevalent benchmarks are 
sector benchmarks (21% of brokers), market benchmarks (20% of brokers), and total 
benchmarks (25% of brokers).  Other brokers typically use either combinations or risk-
adjusted versions of these three benchmarks. Given their popularity, and the simplicity of 
their meaning, we focus our empirical analysis on brokers employing these three 
benchmarks exclusively. 
We begin our analysis by examining whether brokers indeed abide by their 
benchmarks. To answer this question we relate stock recommendations to analysts’ 
outputs regarding firms’ fundamentals. We expect that sector benchmarkers would 
primarily use within-industry information about those fundamentals, while market and 
total benchmarkers would use both within- and across-industry information. Our 
empirical specification follows an extensive literature examining how analysts’ 
recommendations are related to their forecasts (e.g., Bradshaw, 2004; Ertimur, Sunder 
and Sunder, 2007; Chen and Chen, 2009; Barniv et al., 2009). This literature, however, 
does not take into account the benchmark used by the broker. To this end, we break down 
analysts’ earnings and long-term growth (LTG) forecasts into within- and across-industry 
components. Our analysis shows that, as expected, market and total benchmarkers place 
more weight on across-industry expectations than sector benchmarkers when forming 
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their recommendations. These results are consistent with analysts indeed abiding by their 
benchmarks. 
Next we examine whether analysts using a particular benchmark are successful in 
meeting (or beating) the targets associated with their benchmark. To this end, we collect 
for each broker the target return associated with the benchmark. For example, a target 
return for a ‘buy’ recommendation issued by a sector- (market-) benchmarker specifies 
by how much the recommended firm is expected to beat the sector (market). Similarly, a 
target return for a ‘buy’ recommendation issued by a total-benchmarker specifies an 
absolute return such as 10%. We then examine whether the returns of the recommended 
firms meet or beat their targets within a year or until the recommendation is changed. We 
find that analysts using a market/sector benchmark are successful in meeting their targets. 
For examples, ‘buy’ recommendations issued by sector- (market-) benchmarkers beat 
their targets by an average of 3.25% (5.74%). By contrast, total-benchmarkers on average 
fail to meet or beat their targets. For example, the average return obtained by ‘buy’ 
recommendations issued by those analysts is 4.9% lower than their target return. These 
results, however, seem to speak more to the choice of the target than to the performance 
of the analyst. Indeed, total benchmarkers are setting a very high hurdle for themselves, 
whereby a ‘buy’ recommendation is not just a relative statement compared to the market 
or to peers, but also a statement about the market itself.   
Our last analysis explores whether investors actually take into account and 
respond to the different benchmarks. Given that the benchmarks used by analysts are 
public information we expect investors to incorporate them into their responses. For 
example, when a sector benchmarker issues a ‘buy’ recommendation we expect that the 
short-term stock return will exceed the industry return to reflect that. Similarly, ‘buy’ 
recommendations issued by market benchmarkers should result in a price response in 
excess of the market return. Finally, a ‘buy’ recommendation issued by a total 
benchmarker should be followed by a high absolute return. To examine this hypothesis 
we regress three-day price returns around the date of the issuance of the recommendation 
on dummy variables for sector, market, and total benchmarks. Surprisingly, we find very 
little evidence that investors account for the benchmarks in their responses to 
recommendations. Market-adjusted returns are marginally higher following ‘buys’ issued 
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by market benchmarkers, but no similar effect exists regarding industry-adjusted returns 
or total returns following ‘buys’—and reactions to ‘sells’ also do not depend on the type 
of benchmark used. We conclude that, for the most part, investors are either not aware of 
the benchmarks or just do not incorporate them into their trading decisions. 
In Kadan, Madureira, Wang, and Zach (2012) we study different aspects of 
analysts’ industry expertise. In one of the analyses we point out the existence of sell-side 
benchmarks, and use a small sample of disclosures from 20 brokers to study the relation 
between firm and industry recommendations. In contrast, in this paper we focus 
exclusively on these sell-side benchmarks, for which we provide the first large scale and 
comprehensive analysis. Thus, we contribute to the literature by documenting the 
attributes of these benchmarks, exploring the way in which they are reflected in analysts’ 
recommendations, and by studying their implications for investment value.  
Our paper also relates to a long strand of literature examining the relation between 
stock recommendations and other outputs produced by analysts such as earnings 
forecasts, price-targets, and long-term forecasts (e.g., Bradshaw, 2004; Ertimur, Sunder 
and Sunder, 2007; Chen and Chen, 2009; Barniv et al., 2009; Brown and Huang, 2010; 
Kecskes, Michaely and Womack, 2010). Our analysis emphasizes that the usual method 
to assess the relation between recommendations and other analysts’ outputs can be 
improved upon: When regressing recommendations on expectations of earnings and 
LTG, for example, we observe an inconsistency in that recommendations can be industry-
adjusted statements (in the case of sector benchmarkers), while expectations of earnings 
and LTG are not.  
In analyzing whether recommendations perform as predicted, we depart from the 
usual approach taken in the literature. For the most part, the literature has assessed the 
value of analysts’ recommendations through the investment value obtained from 
following a set of recommendations, for example by looking at risk-adjusted returns 
relative to CAPM or a multifactor model, obtained from portfolios formed based on 
recommendations (e.g., Womack (1996), Barber, Lehavy, McNichols and Trueman, 2001 
and 2006; Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, and Lee, 2005). While this approach is useful from 
the perspective of an investor that diversifies her investment over many 
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recommendations, we argue that this is at best an imperfect measure of whether each 
recommendation performs according to its objective. Nothing in the disclosed meaning of 
a recommendation suggests that it should be seen as a prediction about risk-adjusted 
performance (other than benchmark-adjusted performance), nor that it should be assessed 
after it is combined with other recommendations. Instead, the literal meaning of a 
recommendation provides a very clear predictive rule about how its advice should be 
taken. Our assessment of the recommendation value follows this rule directly.  
We proceed as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 provides some 
preliminary analysis of the benchmarks used by different brokers. In Section 4 we 
examine whether analysts abide by their benchmarks. In Section 5 we explore whether 
analysts are successful in meeting their benchmark-specific targets. In Section 6 we study 
investor reactions to recommendations issued by analysts using different benchmarks. 
Section 7 concludes. 
 
2 Data 
We focus on analysts’ stock recommendations of all U.S. firms in the period of 
September 2002 to December 2009.  The source for the analyst recommendations, 
earnings forecasts and LTG projections in this study is the IBES database.  The data on 
firm characteristics are from COMPUSTAT.  We obtain stock returns from CRSP, and 
equity offerings data from SDC. Industry membership is inferred through the industry 
classification defined by the General Industry Classification Standard (GICS) obtained 
from COMPUSTAT. 
We manually collect data on the benchmarks used by brokers that issued at least 
100 recommendations during our sample period. There are 249,459 recommendations 
issued by all brokers during our sample period for US firms, out of which 234,274 are 
issued by brokers with at least 100 recommendations. Therefore, the threshold of 100 
recommendations enables us to concentrate our effort on collecting benchmark data of 
large brokers without significant loss of recommendation data.   
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We start by examining the disclosures of analysts regarding the meaning of their 
firm recommendations. We collect disclosures from three sources.  First, we retrieve 
information from full-text research reports in the Investext database.  Under regulations 
NASD Rule 2711 and NYSE Rule 472, which were adopted prior to the beginning of our 
sample period, analysts are required to disclose the exact meaning of their 
recommendations inside their reports. Analysts normally disclose the information on the 
ratings system, ratings distribution, and the meaning of different ratings in the last section 
of their reports.  Secondly, we collect data from the Investars website,2 which contains 
the ratings definitions of some brokers.  Finally, if necessary, we obtain data directly 
from brokers’ websites.    
< Insert Table 1 here > 
We rely on the analysts’ disclosures to identify the benchmark they use to define 
their recommendations.  We categorize brokers into ten different types of benchmarks. 
Table 1 summarizes these benchmarks and gives examples of textual descriptions from 
the analysts’ disclosures. The three most basic benchmarks involve determining 
recommendations according to the expected performance of the covered stock compared 
to the performance of industry peers, the performance of the market, or to some return 
threshold. More formally, we classify brokers as sector benchmarkers if they state that 
their stock recommendations are benchmarked against sector performance.  For example, 
Smith Barney’s analysts rate stocks based on the“stock’s performance vs. the analyst's 
industry coverage for the coming 12-18 months.” We classify brokers as market 
benchmarkers if they state that their stock recommendations are benchmarked against 
market performance.  For example, Wachovia’s analysts rate a stock based its expected 
performance “relative to the market over the next 12 months.” Finally, we classify 
brokers as total return benchmarkers if they issue recommendations based on a stock’s 
expected total return.  This is the case, for example, with Deutsche Bank, where a ‘buy’ 
recommendation means that the stock’s total return is “expected to appreciate 10% or 





Occasionally brokers determine their recommendations using some combination 
of these three basic benchmarks. We identify four such combinations. For example, 
Dougherty & Co combines features of market and sector benchmarks, so that its ‘buy’ 
means the corresponding stock is “expected to outperform the broader market and/or its 
sector.” We categorize this broker as a market/sector benchmarker. Other hybrids we 
identify are total/market, sector/total, and market/sector/total. 
Other brokers refine the basic benchmarks by adding a risk-adjustment feature. 
For example, Morgan Stanley establishes its recommendations based on the “stocks’s 
total return vs. analyst’s coverage on a risk-adjusted basis.” Notably, the nature of the 
adjustment for risk is often vague. In order to highlight this feature, we add a new 
category and classify Morgan Stanley as a sector/risk benchmarker. Similarly, we classify 
a broker as market/risk (total/risk) when the benchmark involves comparing the stock’s 
expected performance to the market (a total threshold) on some type of risk-adjusted 
measure.  
We also notice some brokers who changed their benchmarks during our sample 
period. For example, Merrill Lynch used a total benchmark between September 2002 and 
May 2008, and a sector/total benchmark since June 2008. In this case, we classify Merrill 
Lynch as a total benchmarker between September 2002 and May 2008, and as a 
sector/total benchmarker between June 2008 and December 2009. However, for some 
brokers, we failed to identify the exact date of the change.  We classify such instances as 
a “Changes” category. Finally, some brokers could not be classified in any of the above 
categories, either because we could not find any data on their analysts’ disclosures or 
because their disclosures did not fall into any of the above categories. 
< Insert Table 2 here > 
Panel A of Table 2 summarizes the distribution of the different benchmarks.3 
There are 37 brokers that use the sector benchmark during our sample period, and the 
number of recommendations issued by such brokers accounts for about 33% of all 
recommendations. The number of brokers relying on a market benchmark is 34, and 
                                                            
3 Overall, there are 173 brokers with at least 100 recommendations issued during the sample period, and 10 
of them change their benchmarks during our sample period. Therefore, the total number of brokers in panel 
A of Table 2 is 183. 
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those brokers issued about 18% of all recommendations. There are 43 brokers that base 
their recommendations on a total return benchmark, and as a group they issued about 
23% of all recommendations. The relevance of these basic benchmarks is apparent also 
when one looks at the size of each broker: Among the twenty largest brokers (according 
to the number of recommendations issued during our sample period), nine brokers use a 
sector benchmark, three brokers use market benchmark, and four brokers use total return 
benchmark. 
Brokers using risk-adjusted benchmarks are usually big brokers, as revealed by 
the average number of recommendations issued by brokers in each category (Morgan 
Stanley is one such case), but there are relatively few of them. Therefore, as a group, 
these brokers account for just 11% of recommendations. Similarly, there are few brokers 
combining the basic benchmarks. Finally, we fail to collect data on benchmarks for 41 
brokers, but these brokers are relatively small (with an average number of 
recommendations of 408 during the sample period), and as a group they issued about 
seven percent of recommendations in our sample.   
In this paper we focus our attention on the three basic benchmarks. Two reasons 
drive our choice. First, we want to address a set of benchmarks that is representative of 
the universe of brokers. Sector, market, and total return benchmarkers thoroughly satisfy 
this requirement: together they account for about 74% of the recommendations in our 
sample period, and they are adopted by 16 of the 20 largest brokers.  Second, we need to 
address benchmarks that have a straightforward interpretation, so that clear testable 
hypotheses can be developed. This requirement again favors the three basic benchmarks, 
as they are the most precisely defined, particularly when compared to the risk-adjusted 
benchmarks (which do not properly document the meaning of their risk-adjustment 
feature) or to the benchmarks that combine more than one basic benchmark.  
3 Preliminary Analysis 
3.1 Benchmark Determinants 
The analysts’ disclosures document that different brokerage houses rely on 
different benchmarks. One obvious question is why. Analysts we have interviewed hinted 
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at a tension about which benchmark should be used. Some analysts suggest that using a 
sector benchmark fits well with the structure of research departments in brokerage 
houses, where analysts work in industry groups and are deemed industry specialists (e.g., 
Boni and Womack, 2006; Kadan, Madureira, Wang, and Zach, 2012). Some analysts also 
pointed out that ranking firms within an industry arises directly from application of 
techniques such as comparables. 
Others expressed preference towards a total benchmark, given that a total return 
expectation is a direct product of applying a discounted cash flow (DCF) methodology. 
They also argued that an expectation about total return, as opposed to the return relative 
to the industry or to the market, is the most useful output from the perspective of 
investors. Finally, some argued that the market benchmark makes sense as well, since it 
is common practice to evaluate each equity asset relative to the market (or a popular 
index such as the S&P 500).  
To add to this anecdotal evidence and provide some large sample results on the 
determinants of the benchmarks, we explore their possible association with brokers’ 
characteristics. We estimate logistic models for the probability of adopting a certain 
benchmark. Each observation in these models is a broker-year pair, describing the 
benchmark used by the broker in that particular year.4 The models presented differ in the 
definition of the dependent variable.  As explanatory variables we use broker and analyst 
characteristics (age, size, number of industries covered, experience) as well as 
characteristics of the covered firms (size and book-to-market).   
< Insert Table 3 here > 
Table 3 presents the results. Two variables emerge as strong determinants of the 
choice of benchmark. The first is broker size—measured by the number of 
recommendations issued by a broker as a fraction of all recommendations issued during 
the year. Larger brokers are more likely to adopt a sector benchmark as opposed to either 
market or total benchmarks. It may be that large brokers that employ a large number of 
analysts can allow analysts to focus on a select group of firms in one particular industry, 
                                                            
4 We also estimated similar cross-sectional regressions separately for each year during the sample period. 
The results are similar. 
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leading to more industry specialization and thereby to sector benchmarking. The second 
determinant is the number of industries covered. A larger number of covered industries is 
associated with a higher likelihood of adopting a market or total benchmark. It may be 
that brokers that follow many industries have a better perspective of the market, and 
thereby are more capable of benchmarking their recommendations to a market or total 
reference. 
3.2 Benchmark Choice and Industry Concentration 
It is well known that brokers tend to organize their sell-side personnel by industry, 
with each analyst covering firms that are related to each other in terms of industry 
membership. Boni and Womack (2006) report that the average analyst has 76% of her 
covered firms belonging to one single industry, and show that most of the value in firm 
recommendations comes from ranking firms within industries. A sector benchmark 
comes naturally to this framework. On the other hand, the ability to rank firms within 
industry is not sufficient to render a diagnostic of the firm’s prospects when a market or 
total benchmark is employed. In particular, the use of a market benchmark implies 
knowledge of the overall market prospects, which requires expertise that goes beyond the 
industry being covered. For these market and total benchmarkers, thus, industry 
specialization is arguably less relevant. This suggests a potential linkage between the 
organizational structure of a broker and the benchmark it adopts.  
We test for this possibility by comparing industry concentration of the broker’s 
analysts across the different types of benchmarks. We follow Boni and Womack (2006) 
in measuring industry concentration. For each year and each analyst, we first recognize a 
firm as belonging to the analyst’s coverage universe if the firm has received at least one 
recommendation from the analyst during the year and that the firm has an outstanding 
recommendation from that analyst at the end of the year. We then define industry 
concentration as the fraction of the analyst’s coverage universe that belongs to her most 
covered GICS industry. Thus, for each year and each broker, we have the industry 
concentration measures for the analysts employed by that broker. We then compare the 




< Insert Table 4 here > 
Panel A of Table 4 shows that in fact analysts employed by sector benchmarkers 
tend to concentrate in single industries more than their counterparts employed by market 
and total benchmarkers, though the differences in concentration are relatively small. For 
example, in 2002 the average analyst employed by a sector benchmarker has 80.2% of 
her covered firms belonging to one single industry, compared to 75.3% (76.6%) in the 
case of an analyst employed by a market (total) benchmarker. Given the potential for 
these averages to be overwhelmed by the industry concentration measures of analysts 
with a small coverage universe (e.g., the minimum industry concentration for an analyst 
covering two firms is 50%). Results are similar when we restrict the sample to analysts 
having at least 5 firms in her coverage universe (Panel B).  
The univariate statistics suggest smaller concentration by industry for market and 
total benchmarkers, but they do not corroborate the view that market or total 
benchmarkers avoid concentrating by industry. In fact, the numbers for market and total 
benchmarkers clearly show they also concentrate by industry, just not to the same extent 
that sector benchmarkers do. Moreover, these differences might be an artifact of the 
brokers’ and analysts’ characteristics. For example, smaller brokers might have a weaker 
ability to concentrate. If market benchmakers are smaller, then we could see less 
concentration due to broker size. The size of the analyst’s coverage universe can also 
mechanically affect the measure of industry concentration, given that the number of firms 
in a single industry is finite.5 It is also possible that experience correlates with 
concentration, because recently hired analysts might be given a relatively easier task of 
covering firms that are similar to each other. 
To control for these confounding factors, we examine the relationship between the 
analyst’s industry concentration and the benchmark adopted by its employer in a 
regression setup. We run yearly regressions where the data points are analysts for which 
we were able to collect industry concentration measures. The main variable of interest is 
a dummy for whether the analyst’s broker uses a sector benchmark. As control variables, 
                                                            
5 Take two analysts who focus mostly on a GICS composed of 30 firms. If one such analyst is covering 
more than 30 firms, her industry concentration is bound to be lower than 100%; if the other analyst covers 
fewer than 30 firms, that it is possible to have an industry concentration of 100%. 
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we use the “size” of the broker (the log of the number of analysts employed by the 
broker), the analyst coverage universe (proxied by the log of the number of firms in her 
coverage universe) and analyst experience (proxied by the log of number of days since 
the analyst first entered the IBES dataset).  
The results, reported in Panel B of Table 4, confirm that brokers employing more 
analysts tend to achieve higher levels of industry concentration. As for analysts, a larger 
coverage universe and more years of experience are associated with less industry 
concentration. Finally, the relevance of the association between the adoption of a sector 
benchmark by a broker and the corresponding industry concentration of its analysts is 
severely diminished in a multivariate setting, with the coefficient of the sector dummy 
significant at the 5% level in only 3 out of 8 regression years. If we further restrict the 
sample to the analysts with a minimum coverage universe of 5 firms, no such coefficient 
is significant. Therefore, while analysts employed by sector benchmarkers do present a 
slightly higher industry concentration, this has more to do with brokers and analysts’ 
characteristics, rather than the benchmark adopted by the broker. 
3.3 Benchmark Choice and Distribution of Recommendations 
Next we examine whether the choice of the benchmark is associated with the 
characteristics of the recommendations issued by a broker. Panel A of Table 5 and Figure 
1 report the distribution of recommendations broken down by the benchmark adopted by 
the broker. The table demonstrates an important and salient feature that distinguishes the 
behavior of sector benchmarkers from market and total benchmarkers: Sector 
benchmarkers tend to be less optimistic. Average recommendation levels from sector 
benchmarkers are significantly higher as compared to the average recommendation from 
market and sector benchmarkers.6 Moreover, for each year during our sample period 
sector benchmarkers show a smaller proportion of optimistic recommendations and a 
larger proportion of pessimistic recommendations compared to market or total 
benchmarkers. The gap between sector vs. market and total benchmarkers has diminished 
over the years, especially due to the sector benchmarkers reducing their share of 
                                                            
6 In the computation of the average recommendation, strong buys and buys are mapped to level 1, holds are 
mapped to level 2, and sells and strong sells are mapped to level 3. 
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pessimistic recommendations, but it is still significant at the end of the sample. Notably, 
market and total benchmarkers behave very similarly, especially with respect to the 
issuance of pessimistic recommendations.    
 
< Insert Table 5 and Figure 1 here > 
It is possible that the less optimistic nature of recommendations from sector 
benchmarkers is an anomaly concentrated in a few industries. We check for this 
possibility by looking at the distribution of recommendations summarized within each 
industry. Results are shown in Panel B of Table 5. They suggest that sector benchmarkers 
are consistently less optimistic across industries. For example, for each type of broker 
and each industry, we compute the range of recommendation as the difference between 
the most optimistic and least optimistic recommendation outstanding for that industry. 
(The maximum range is 2.) Panel B of Table 5 shows that the average industry range for 
recommendations from sector benchmarkers is consistently higher than the corresponding 
range from market or total benchmarkers. It is also the case that more often an industry 
has a bigger range from recommendations issued by sector benchmarkers. Finally, sector 
benchmarkers consistently have more industries with at least one outstanding 
recommendation carrying a pessimistic tone.  
< Insert Table 6 here > 
Table 6 further explores the relation between benchmark choice and broker 
optimism in a multivariate setting. We use firm fixed-effects logistic regressions 
including all recommendations during our sample period. The dependent variable is an 
indicator equal to one when the recommendation is optimistic in model (1) and 
pessimistic in model (2). Given the similarity in the distribution of recommendations 
from market and total benchmarkers, we compare these two benchmarks, as a group, with 
the sector benchmarkers. Our main explanatory variable is an indicator for benchmark 
adopted by the broker issuing the recommendation: It is equal to one if the broker is a 
sector benchmarker and zero otherwise.   
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The choice of which control variables to adopt is made easier by the firm fixed-
effects specification, since it frees us from having to include firm characteristics that are 
not varying over time. So, instead, we focus on some broker characteristics and time-
varying aspects that have been shown in prior studies to affect the optimism of brokers.   
There is a long literature relating conflicts of interest stemming from the relationship 
between investment banking and sell-side research to the optimism in analyst 
recommendations (e.g., Lin and McNichols,1998; Michaely and Womack, 1999). We use 
a broker affiliation dummy to proxy for such conflicts of interest.  The affiliation dummy 
variable is equal to one if the broker issuing the recommendation was a lead underwriter 
or a co-manager in an equity offering for the firm in the 24 months before the 
recommendation announcement date.7 We also control for past market and firm 
performance, based on the evidence that analysts chase momentum (Jegadeesh, Kim, 
Krische, and Lee, 2004), and for broker and analyst characteristics. SANCT is an 
indicator equal to one if the recommendation is issued by an analyst who is employed by 
a brokerage house that was sanctioned during the Global Settlement (Barber, Lehavy, 
McNichols, and Trueman, 2006; Kadan, Madureira, Wang, and Zach, 2009). TIER3 is an 
indicator variable for whether a brokerage house uses a three-tier recommendation grid at 
the time a recommendation is issued (Kadan, Madureira, Wang, and Zach, 2009). Finally, 
we control for the experience of the individual analyst issuing the recommendation. 
The results confirm the univariate inferences in Table 5, showing that the 
benchmarking decision is strongly associated with the bullishness of the 
recommendations. Sector benchmarkers are less likely to issue optimistic 
recommendations and more likely to issue pessimistic recommendations as compared to 
market and total benchmarkers.8  
                                                            
7 We also try two other proxies of potential conflicts of interest. Following Kadan, Madureira, Wang, and 
Zach (2009), these proxies control for whether the firm has gone through an IPO or and SEO during the 6-
24 months prior to the recommendation issuance, and for any financial deficit during the year in which the 
recommendation was issued. Results reported in the paper are robust to the adoption of these proxies. 
8 One way to reinforce the association between a broker’s benchmark and the distribution of the broker’s 
recommendations is to look at instances where a broker changes its benchmark. We identify four events 
where both the old and the new benchmark are one of the three basic benchmarks analyzed here.  In two of 
them (both changes from total to sector benchmarker), no significant change in the distribution of 
recommendations follows the change in benchmark. In the other two, though, there is a significant increase 
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It is documented that analysts have a tendency to be overly optimistic for the 
subjects they cover (e.g., McNichols and O’Brien, 1997). One possible explanation for 
this optimism is that analysts become attached to the subjects of their coverage—be it 
firms or industries. Since sector benchmarkers rank firms within their industry, their firm 
recommendations suffer from only one source of optimism: their attachment to the firms 
they cover. By contrast, market benchmarkers incorporate both their firm and industry 
views into their firm recommendations. Hence, their firm recommendations might suffer 
from two sources of optimism. As a result, the distribution of recommendations coming 
from market and total benchmarkers is tilted toward optimism when compared to that of 
sector benchmarkers. 
4 Do Analysts Abide by their Benchmarks when Issuing 
Recommendations? 
That an analyst asserts that her recommendation advice should be interpreted 
according to some specific benchmark does not imply that the benchmark is actually used 
when a recommendation advice is determined. In fact, the common structure of research 
departments along industry groups raises the possibility that all analysts determine their 
recommendation advice through the ranking of their coverage universe regardless of 
stated benchmark. In this section, we empirically examine whether the different 
benchmarks are applied by the analysts when they determine their recommendation 
advice. Answering this question is important both for validating the analysts’ disclosures 
and for better interpreting stock recommendations.  
What are the implications of the proper usage of each benchmark? Consider first 
analysts declaring the use of a sector benchmark. According to their disclosures, stock 
recommendations are statements about the analysts’ expectations on how stocks will 
perform relative to their industry peers; that is, these analysts just rank firms within each 
industry. As such, in determining their recommendations, these analysts would focus on 
their expectations of the firm’s performance relative to the industry, as opposed to their 
expectations of the firm performance relative to the market or of the firm’s absolute 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
in the fraction of ‘sell’ recommendations around the event of change in benchmark: a jump from 5% to 
12% in the case of a change from market to sector benchmarker, and from 3% to 17% in the case of a 
change from total to sector benchmarker. 
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performance. By contrast, market and total benchmarkers would determine their 
recommendations by relying on their expectations of both the firm performance relative 
to the industry and the industry’s overall performance relative to the market. But, of 
course, the analyst’s expectations about these different components are unobservable. For 
example, when a market benchmarker issues a buy, stating that she expects the stock to 
outperform the market by 10%, we do not know her true expectation of the firm 
performance relative to the industry or her expectation of the industry performance 
relative to the market.  
However, some measures of analysts’ expectations are observable. Besides 
issuing recommendations, analysts also consistently release forecasts about the firm’s 
upcoming earnings and about the firm’s long-term growth (LTG). Our strategy is thus to 
rely on the analysts’ revealed expectations in order to assess whether benchmarks are in 
fact used when recommendations are formed. In considering the relation between 
analysts’ recommendations and analysts’ other outputs such as earnings and LTG 
forecasts, we are following a long literature (e.g., Bradshaw, 2004; Ertimur, Sunder and 
Sunder, 2007; Chen and Chen, 2009; Barniv et al., 2009; Brown and Huang, 2010; 
Kecskes, Michaely and Womack, 2010). One way to analyze this relation is to regress 
recommendations on measures of analysts’ earnings and LTG forecasts. A typical model 
looks like 
             (1)                                                       ,P/ELTGRec P/ELTG0   
where Rec is an integer mapping the recommendation levels—for example, ‘strong buy’ 
and ‘buy’ are mapped to 1, ‘hold’ to 2, ‘sell’ and ‘strong sell’ to ‘3’. The independent 
variables are obtained from the analysts’ expectations about LTG and earnings. Given 
that the earnings number is mechanically linked to the number of outstanding shares (and 
the prevalence of the use of comparables techniques by sell-side analysts when analyzing 
companies), the earnings-price ratio is used instead of the raw measure of earnings per 
share estimates. To avoid extreme values in the independent variables, researchers use 
rankings of the LTG and E/P measures, where values are scaled to range from 0 to 1. The 
results in the literature show that the coefficients βLTG and βE/P are negative: higher 
17 
 
expectations about LTG and forward earnings-price ratios are associated with lower 
levels of—that is, more optimistic—recommendations.9 
The model above needs to be revamped if brokers rely on different benchmarks 
when determining their recommendations. To see this point, consider sector 
benchmarkers. For these brokers, while recommendations are just a ranking relative to 
industry peers, expectations about earnings-price ratios and LTG are by nature absolute, 
and do not immediately translate into an industry ranking. In other words, there is an 
inconsistency between the left-hand side (LHS) and right-hand side (RHS) variables: the 
LHS variable, the recommendation, is industry-adjusted while the RHS variables are 
not.10  
We aim at extending model (1) in a way that will capture both within- and across-
industry relative expectations. To see the idea, suppose we have the analyst’s 
expectations about (i) how the firm’s LTG compares with the LTG of its peers in the 
industry (“within-industry” LTG expectation); and (ii) how the LTG of its industry 
compares to the LTG of the other industries (“across-industry” LTG expectation). If this 
analyst is a market or total benchmarker, she will rely on both expectations when 
determining her recommendation advice. On the other hand, if the analyst is a sector 
benchmarker, she will mostly (or totally) rely on the first component. In other words, all 
brokers (sector, market, or total benchmarkers) would “load” on their within-industry 
expectations, but sector benchmarkers would not load (or at least load less) on the across-
industry expectations when compared to market and total benchmarkers.  
We do not observe the within-industry and across-industry expectations directly, 
but we can infer them from the raw forecasts issued by the analysts. More specifically, 
                                                            
9 LTG and price-earnings ratios are just two examples of “valuation” proxies based on analysts’ estimates 
that can be used in a regression model to explain recommendations. Other proxies have been explored in 
the literature, such as the residual income valuation model analyzed by Bradshaw (2004). We focus on the 
LTG and price-earnings proxies in this study for two reasons. They are the simplest and most parsimonious 
proxies (other proxies such as the residual income depend on further assumptions for their estimation) and 
their associations with recommendation levels are the most robust across the studies relating 
recommendations and other outputs from sell-side analysts. 
10Under the assumption that sector benchmarkers do rely on industry rankings in determining 
recommendations, mixing sector with market and total benchmarkers when running a regression like model 
(1) renders the model less likely to capture the proper relationship between recommendations and forecasts 
of LTG and earnings. That the current literature has captured such relationship even without accounting for 
the benchmark used by the broker just adds to the robustness of this relationship. 
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we decompose analysts’ expectations of LTG and earnings into an across-industry (AI) 
and within-industry (WI) components as follows. Starting with the LTG forecasts, each 
month we first compute for each firm the consensus LTG as the average LTG forecast 
amongst the outstanding forecasts available for that firm.11 In the next step, we define for 
each industry an industry LTG forecast as the average LTG consensus across all firms in 
that industry. Then, for each firm in that month we compute the firm’s industry-adjusted 
LTG forecast as the firm’s LTG forecast minus its industry LTG forecast. We assign each 
firm a score between 0 and 1 based on the ranking of industry-adjusted LTG forecasts in 
each industry. We denote this score by WI_LTG. For each firm we also calculate an 
across-industry LTG score based on the ranking of its industry LTG forecasts across all 
industries. The latter is denoted AI_LTG. Similarly, we calculate a within- and across-
industry earnings estimate rankings denoted by WI_E/P and AI_E/P respectively, based 
on the analyst earnings forecast scaled by the stock price prevailing when the earnings 
data are collected.12  
We then estimate the following model: 
     (2)         ,P/E_WIP/E_AILTG_WILTG_AIRec P/E_WIP/E_AILTG_WILTG_AI0   
where Rec takes the value of 1, 2, or 3 for “optimistic,” “neutral,” and “pessimistic,” 
respectively.13 In line with the prior literature we expect all the coefficients to be 
negative, reflecting that better earnings and growth prospects are associated with more 
optimistic recommendations. More relevant for our focus, we run these models separately 
for sector and market or total benchmarkers. We then expect βAI_LTG and βAI_E/P for 
market and total benchmarkers to be more negative than the corresponding coefficients 
for sector benchmarkers.  
                                                            
11 These consensus measures cannot be taken from the summary file from IBES, but rather have to be built 
from the detail files. This is because the summary file from IBES computes consensus across all available 
brokers, while in our study we need consensus built from some subsets of brokers (for example, consensus 
taken from sector benchmarkers only). 
12 We use unadjusted measures of forecasts of 1-year ahead earnings. Forecasts that are older than 12 
months are deleted. Results are robust to using 2-year ahead projections, and to relaxing the 12-months 
limit on the outstanding measures.  
13 Optimistic refer to ‘strong buy’ and ‘buy’ recommendations; neutral refer to ‘hold’ recommendations; 
and pessimistic refer to ‘sell’ and ‘strong sell’ recommendations. This 3-tier mapping differs from the usual 
5-tier mapping adopted by the literature. The change is motivated by the sample period of our study. After 
2002 (the period of our study), most of the brokers have adopted a three-tier rating system. The qualitative 
inferences reported here are robust to mapping the recommendations into a range of 1 through 5 (from 
‘strong buy’ to ‘strong sell’, respectively). 
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< Insert Table 7 here > 
We estimate models (1) and (2) using monthly regressions. The results are 
reported in Table 7. The table shows the Fama-MacBeth’s (1973) style coefficients from 
averaging the monthly regressions from September 2002 through December 2009, where 
the standard errors for the mean coefficients are adjusted for autocorrelation (see, for 
example, Loughran and Schultz; 2005; Fama and French, 2002).  Specifications (i) and 
and (ii) in Table 7 show estimates of model (1), the one traditionally pursued in the 
literature, by which LTG and E/P are not broken into within- and across-industry 
components. As expected, the coefficients are significantly negative for both sector and 
non-sector (market or total) benchmarkers, reflecting that better views on the earnings of 
the company do translate on average into a more favorable recommendation.  
In specifications (iii) and (iv) we estimate model (2) separately for sector and for 
market and total benchmarkers. We also estimate a model on a pooled sample that allows 
us to compare the coefficients related to different benchmarks (using appropriate dummy 
variables). The results show that both within- and across-industry expectations are 
incorporated into the recommendations of both analyst types as all the coefficients are 
negative. Notice, however, that the loadings on across-industry expectations are 
significantly higher in absolute value for market and total benchmarkers compared to 
sector benchmarkers (0.264 vs. 0.183 for LTG and 0.107 vs. 0.032 for E/P, both different 
at the 1% level). This suggests that market and total benchmarkers put more weight on 
across-industry expectations when issuing recommendations compared to sector 
benchmarkers. By contrast, we do not find a significant difference in coefficients of the 
within-industry measures of expectations for LTG and E/P, suggesting that all brokers 
take this information into account to a similar degree when issuing recommendations.14 
These results support the hypothesis that market and total benchmarkers do 
behave differently from sector benchmarkers in how they use expectations about the 
firms’ fundamentals when determining their recommendations. Sector benchmarkers 
                                                            
14 A natural concern is that the firms covered by sector and market benchmarkers are fundamentally 
different, and hence the results we uncover are driven by differences in the characteristics of the covered 
firms, rather than by the adopted benchmark. To address this issue we repeat the analysis in Table 7 for a 
subsample of firms that are covered by both sector and market/total benchmarkers. The results of this 
analysis are very similar to those reported in Table 7 (and available upon request). 
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mostly rely on the ranking of a firm’s fundamentals within its industry (though they also 
use the across-industry expectation of LTG). Market and total benchmarkers, while also 
ranking firms within industry, use their expectations about the firm’s industry 
performance as compared to the other industries to a larger degree than sector 
benchmarkers. This behavior is consistent with the stated benchmark in the analysts’ 
disclosures.  
This methodology also sheds some light on why market and total benchmarkers 
are in general more optimistic than sector benchmarkers. If it was only for the within-
industry expectation of the firm’s fundamentals, brokers with different benchmarks 
would be similar in the optimism presented in their recommendations. It is the extra 
loading on the analysts’ expectations about how the fundamentals of the firm’s industry 
compare to the fundamentals of the other industries that distinguishes market and total 
benchmarkers from the sector benchmarkers. If you take two analysts having the same 
relative expectations about the firms and their industries fundamentals, the analyst that 
works based on a market or total benchmark becomes more optimistic compared to a 
sector benchmarker because she puts extra weights on the across-industry dimensions of 
her expectations.15 Notice also that the intercept is significantly smaller in the regression 
for market and total benchmarkers when compared to regression based on sector 
benchmarkers (2.998 vs 3.074, significantly different at the 1% level). That is, there is an 
extra level of optimism for market and total benchmarkers that is not linked to either the 
industry or the firm’s prospects, but this extra level of optimism by itself does not explain 
the optimism gap between sector and non-sector benchmarkers presented in Table 5. 
5 Do Analysts’ Meet their Recommendation Targets? 
The results in the previous section suggest that analysts do indeed take the 
different benchmarks into account when issuing their recommendations. Different 
benchmarks are associated with different targets. Thus, it is natural to ask how successful 
analysts are in meeting (or beating) the targets declared in their disclosed benchmarks. 
For sector benchmarkers beating the target would mean beating the sector; for market 
                                                            
15 This interpretation is made easier given that RHS variables are normalized between 0 and 1.   
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benchmarkers it would mean beating the market; and for total benchmarkers it would 
mean beating some absolute threshold. In this section, we analyze the performance of 
analysts based on whether the recommended stocks behave “as promised” in the analysts’ 
disclosures, meeting or beating their declared target. 
< Insert Table 8 here > 
In order to ascertain whether the recommendation’s objective is achieved, we first 
take a closer look at how analysts state their objectives. Besides the benchmark, the 
recommendation’s objective (or, its literal meaning) carries a target threshold as well, and 
the target threshold varies across different analysts. For example, in the case of a ‘buy’, 
some analysts may expect the recommended stock return to surpass the benchmark return 
by 10%, while others may require a 5% outperformance.16 Table 8 presents summary 
statistics of the target thresholds used by the brokers in our sample. Panel A shows the 
thresholds used by market benchmarkers. The most frequent target is ‘0’, saying that a 
typical ‘buy’ recommendation issued by a market benchmarker means that the 
recommended stock’s return will exceed the market return over the forecast horizon. This 
threshold is used by 20 out of the 34 market benchmarkers in our sample. Panel B shows 
that for sector benchmarkers the most common threshold is also ‘0’, which corresponds 
to the expectation that the stock’s return of a buy recommendation exceeds the industry 
return over the forecast horizon. Finally, Panel C presents the threshold distribution for 
total benchmarkers. Here, the most prevalent threshold is 15%, which corresponds to the 
expectation that the total return of a stock with a buy recommendation over the forecasted 
horizon should be at least 15%. Though, notably, in this case targets of 10% or 20% are 
also quite popular.  Target thresholds for ‘sell’ recommendations are typically symmetric, 
and are not reported for brevity. 
We evaluate whether a target has been achieved as follows: (i) If the 
recommendation has not been changed for a year, we compare the cumulative stock 
                                                            
16 The literal meaning of the recommendation also includes the forecast horizon: how long should it take 
for the recommendation prediction to materialize. In this case, though, a very common trend emerges, with 
the vast majority of the brokers working on a 12-month horizon. In a few cases, the broker adopts a range 
for its forecast horizon (for example, saying that the recommendation is based on the “stock's performance 
vs. the analyst's industry coverage for the coming 12-18 months”), though in these situations the 12-months 
period tends to be part of the declared range. 
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return during the year to the benchmark; (ii) If the recommendation advice has been 
changed within 12 months after it was issued (e.g., through a cancelation or an 
upgrade/downgrade), we compare the cumulative stock return until the end of the day 
when the recommendation was changed to the benchmark return. We thus refer to the 
target date of a recommendation as the earlier of 12 months and the date in which the 
recommendation advice has been revoked.17 
Panel A of Table 9 presents the fraction of buy/sell recommendations, which meet 
the target specified by each analyst broken down by the three different categories: Sector, 
market, and total benchmarkers. The results show that slightly more than 50% of buy 
recommendations issued by market/sector benchmarkers meet or beat their benchmark. 
By contrast, less than 40% of buy recommendations issued by total-bencharkers meet 
their benchmark. The results for “sell” recommendations are similar, as more than 55% 
of “sells” coming from market/sector benchmarkers achieve their benchmarkers but only 
about 36% of “sells” coming from total benchmarkers do so. 
These results seem plausible, as meeting the benchmark for total-benchmarkers is 
quite a heroic task. For example, when a typical total-benchmarker issues a “buy” 
recommendation she expects the stock price to increase by at least 15%, regardless of the 
market or the industry performance. Thus, a stock recommendation from a total-
benchmarker is a statement about the stock and the market, while recommendations from 
market/industry benchmarkers are only relative statements. Thus, total benchmarkers are 
much more prone to missing their targets. 
Panel B of Table 9 considers the magnitudes by which analysts beat (or miss) 
their targets. The table reports the average difference between the realized returns and the 
benchmark return for each recommendation in our sample. The results are consistent with 
those in Panel A. Indeed, both market- and industry-benchmarkers significantly beat their 
targets for both “buy” and “sell” recommendations. For example, a “buy” 
                                                            
17 In other words, a recommendation is evaluated throughout its stated life span as long as its advice is still 
outstanding. This definition of the life span of a recommendation is similar to the approach used in the 
literature when examining the investment value of recommendations. When forming portfolio based on 
recommendations, stocks are included in a portfolio when a new recommendation appears, and the stock in 
kept in the portfolio until the earlier date between (1) the end of the stated life span of the recommendation 
and (2) the date when the recommendation advice is revoked. See, for example, Barber, Lehavy, 
McNichols, and Trueman (2006) and Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman (2007). 
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recommendation from a sector-benchmarker yields a return that exceeds the sector-
benchmark by 325 basis points. By contrast, total benchmarkers on average miss their 
benchmarks. For example, a “sell” recommendation issued by a total-benchmarker misses 
the total benchmarker by1260 basis points, on average. Note that the t-stats in this 
analysis are very large. This is likely due to dependence both across-time and across 
brokers. We deal with these issues below in our multivariate analysis. 
< Insert Table 9 here > 
In Panel C we report the raw returns associated with the different stock 
recommendations broken by benchmark type. As before, the time period is the earliest of 
12 months or until the recommendation has been changed. Notice that the raw returns for 
“buy” recommendations issued by market-, sector-, and total-benchmarkers are not very 
different from each other (10.6%, 11.1%, and 9.8%). While the t-stats for the comparison 
between market- and total-benchmarkers seem significant, this is likely due to 
dependencies in observations, as in the multivariate analysis (to follow) this significance 
disappears.  
In sum, the univariate analysis suggests that market- and sector-benchmarkers are 
successful in meeting/beating their benchmarks, while total-bechmarkers are not. 
However, this result stems mostly from the stated benchmarks (which are much tougher 
form total-benchmarkers) and not from the raw returns, which are not materially different 
across the three groups. 
Table 10 provides a multivariate analysis of these issues. In Panel A we regress 
the difference between the cumulative return and the target return on benchmark 
indicators and a set of control variables including past firm and market performance to 
account for momentum, analysts’ experience, broker size, firm size, and book-to-market. 
We also need to control for the general tendency of a broker to issue each type of 
recommendation. If a broker is in general more stringent with respect to issuing ‘buys’ it 
is likely that its ‘buys’ are more meaningful.18 We follow Barber, Lehavy, McNichols 
                                                            
18  Barber, Lehavy, McNichols and Trueman (2006) report that indeed the investment value of 
recommendations depends on the overall ‘favorableness’ (or proclivity to issue ‘buys’) of each broker. 
Given the results in Section 3 that the distribution of recommendations differs across different 
benchmarkers, we also need to control for this favorableness here. 
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and Trueman (2006) and include dummies for the broker’s favorableness quintiles. These 
quintiles are determined each quarter by ranking brokers in ascending order according to 
the percentage of each type of recommendation at the end of the previous quarter.19 We 
include in the regression dummies for quintiles 1 (least favorable) through quintile 4 (that 
is, quintile 5, the most favorable, is the baseline to which the other dummies should be 
compared). In all of the analyses we cluster the standard errors at the broker level to 
account for intra-broker dependencies.20   
< Insert Table 10 here > 
Column (1) of Panel A shows the result for “buy” recommendations without any 
controls, which are equivalent to those of Panel A of Table 9, only with clustered 
standard errors. In this specification the constant of 325 basis points should be interpreted 
as the excess return (compared to the benchmark) for sector-benchmarkers. It can be seen 
that market-benchmarkers’ excess returns are somewhat higher, while the excess returns 
for total-benchmarkers are significantly lower, and even negative. When we add the 
controls in Columns (2) and (3) the results persist. We still observe positive abnormal 
returns for both market- and sector-benchmarkers, and negative excess returns for total 
benchmarkers. 
When considering “sell” recommendations the results in Column (4) are similar to 
those in Panel A of Table 9. Once we add the controls the excess returns of market- 
sector-performance lose their significance, whereas the significant underperformance of 
total-benchmarkers remains. 
Panel B of Table 10 presents a multivariate analysis of raw returns using the same 
set of controls. In contrast to Panel A, here we do not observe a difference between the 
                                                            
19 Barber et al (2006) considered favorableness based on fraction of ‘buys’ only, while we separately look 
at favorableness towards ‘buys’ for the regression examining ‘buys’ and favorableness towards ‘sells’ for 
the regression examining ‘sells’. The difference is explained by the sample period of the two studies. For 
Barber et al (2006), most of the data comes from the period before September 2002, when sells were rare, 
so the vast majority of the recommendations were in practice spread between ‘buys’ and ‘hold’, and 
therefore the favorableness towards ‘buys’ would be a good summary of the overall distribution of 
recommendations for the broker. Our sample period starts in September 2002, when recommendations 
become more balanced between ‘buys’ and ‘sells,’ so a broker’s favorableness towards ‘buys’ does not 
denote necessarily its lack of favorableness towards ‘sells.’ 
20 We also tried clustering at the year or firm level, and noticed that clustering at the broker level has the 




three groups of benchmarkers. This reinforces our interpretation that the difference in 
abnormal performance comes from the benchmarks and not from the returns. 
 
6 Do Investors Pay Attention to Benchmarks? 
In this section we examine short-term reactions to recommendations to study 
whether investors account for the different interpretations analysts assign to their 
recommendations. If investors internalize the different benchmarks disclosed by analysts, 
and believe the recommendation advice, then we expect differential short-term price 
response to recommendations depending on the benchmark being used.  
Take a ‘buy’ recommendation issued by a market benchmarker, for example. 
Recall from our previous discussion that such ‘buy’ is a statement that the recommended 
stock will outperform the market. If the investors believe the ‘buy’ statement from a 
market benchmarker, and they act in an expeditious manner, then this ‘buy’ should result 
in an abnormally positive price response relative to the market. Moreover, this belief does 
not imply any particular price response relative to the sector, or any absolute price 
response.  Similarly, a ‘buy’ from a sector benchmarker would elicit an abnormally 
positive price response relative to the industry, and a ‘buy’ from a total benchmarker 
would elicit an absolute price reaction, but these buys would not necessarily bring an 
abnormal positive price response relative to the market.  
We measure price responses as the three-day cumulative stock returns around the 
recommendation announcement date. Given that we have three types of benchmarks, we 
compute price reactions in three ways: market-adjusted, industry-adjusted, and total (raw) 
returns. The market-adjusted return is defined as the difference between the return on the 
stock and the market return over the course of the three days. Similarly, the industry-
adjusted return is calculated as the difference between the return on the stock and the 
return on the corresponding GICS industry.  
If investors internalize the different benchmarks then prices reactions should 
reflect this. For example market-adjusted returns should be higher for ‘buy’ 
recommendations issued by market-benchmarkers, as compared to industry and total 
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benchmarkers. Similarly, industry-adjusted returns for ‘sell’ recommendations issued by 
sector benchmarkers should be lower than for such recommendations issued by market 
and total benchmarkers, and so on. The null hypothesis is that investors do not account 
for the different benchmarks, and respond equally to recommendations issued by brokers 
of different types regardless of the adjustment used. 
Panel A of Table 11 reports the average three-day returns of buy and hold 
recommendations issued by analysts with different benchmarks. Regardless of the return 
measure we use, on average, buy (sell) recommendations from sector benchmarkers are 
more positive (less negative). However, this is just a univariate test. To control for 
possible differences in drivers of short-term performance, we regress three-day price 
reactions on dummies capturing the benchmark adopted by the analyst. We estimate six 
different OLS models, combining the two types of recommendations (‘buys’ and ‘sells’) 
with the three types of short-term price reactions (market-adjusted, industry-adjusted, and 
total returns). As in the analysis of the long-term performance, we adopt a firm and year 
fixed effects regression model. All the explanatory variables are similar to those used in 
Table 10. 
< Insert Table 11 here > 
Panel B presents results of multivariate regressions to explain short-term reactions 
to ‘buy’ recommendations. If investors take into account the literal meanings of the 
benchmarks we would expect positive coefficients for: (i) the market benchmark dummy 
in the regression explaining market-adjusted returns; (ii) the sector benchmark dummy in 
the regression explaining industry-adjusted returns; and (iii) the total benchmark dummy 
in the regression explaining total returns. There is evidence that market-adjusted reactions 
are more pronounced when ‘buys’ are issued by market benchmarkers: the market 
dummy in specification (1) indicates an extra abnormal return of 21 basis points, 
significant at 5%. However, part of the effect dissipates when the favorableness quintiles 
are included: the market dummy is only significant at the 10% level in specification (2). 
None of the coefficients explaining industry-adjusted and total returns is significantly 
different from zero—specifications (3) thru (6). The benchmark dummies are also not 
significantly different from zero in the regressions (Panel C) explaining reactions to 
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‘sells’. In summary, there is at best very limited evidence that the type of benchmark 
adopted by the broker matters in how investors react to the recommendation in the short-
term period following the issuance of the recommendation. 
7 Conclusion 
In this paper we examine the literal meaning of sell-side analysts’ stock 
recommendations. We document that different brokers rely on different benchmarks with 
respect to which the investment advice in each recommendation should be interpreted. 
For example, a ‘buy’ from a market benchmarker is a prediction that the recommended 
stock is expected to outperform the market; a ‘buy’ from sector benchmarker denotes the 
analyst’s expectation that the stock will outperform its peers in the same industry; finally, 
a buy from a total benchmarker suggests the stock will beat some absolute return 
threshold. 
We show that these benchmarks are not an irrelevant detail in the analyst’s 
disclosure about how recommendations should be viewed. Instead, such benchmarks are 
in fact used when analysts form their recommendation advice. For example, sector 
benchmarkers, who profess to basically rank firms within each industry, do rely less on 
across-industry expectations about fundamentals—such as earnings and LTG 
projections—when compared to market and total benchmarkers. This suggests that the 
use of each recommendation—by investors or by academics—should take into 
consideration the benchmark under which it is formed.  
We apply this reasoning in two different setups. First, we examine whether the 
benchmarks affects the predictive ability of each recommendation advice. We show that 
market- and sector-benchmarkers are able to significantly beat their benchmarks, but 
total-benchmarkers fail to do so. Second, we ask whether investors pay attention to these 
benchmarks. By examining how short-term price reactions to recommendations depend 
on the broker’s declared benchmark, we do not find much evidence that benchmarks have 
mattered in how investors view—and react to—recommendations.  
Our evidence suggests that both academics and investors should pay more 
attention to the declared objective of each recommendation. In particular, the fact that 
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different recommendations carry different meanings can be used to shed new light on a 
range of empirical questions. Ramnath, Rock, and Shane (2008), for example, advocate 
the need for a better understanding of how analysts operate. The different benchmarkers 
employed by brokers suggest that information shocks would affect recommendations 
differently depending on the broker’s benchmark—e.g., with industry shocks affecting 
more the recommendations from market and total benchmarkers when compared to 
recommendations from sector benchmarkers.  Another potential area worth of a second 
look is the long literature on how incentives affect bias and performance of 
recommendations (e.g., Lin and McNichols, 1998; Michaely and Womack, 1999). This 
comes naturally once one recognizes that performance is a comparison of the return path 
of the recommended stock with its stated objective, and thus should take into 
consideration the benchmark adopted by the broker. In fact, determining superiority 
among analysts in terms of their stock picking abilities (e.g., Mikhail, Walther, and 
Willis, 2004) might need adjustment as well, given that different analysts arguably pick 
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Table 1. Description of Benchmarks 
This table summarizes the different types of benchmarks brokers use in our sample. For each type of benchmark, the description of the benchmark  
and one example of the textual description of recommendations are provided.   
Benchmark Description Examples of textual description of recommendations 
Sector Recommendation is benchmarked against performance of peers in the same sector 
“Our ratings reflect expected stock price performance relative to each analyst's coverage 
universe.” 
Market Recommendation is benchmarked against market performance Performance “relative to the market index over the next 12 months.” 
Total Return Recommendation is based on a stock's total return. 
“The rating system is based on a stock's forward -12-month expected total return (price 
appreciation plus dividend yield).”  
Market/Sector Recommendation is benchmarked against market and/or sector performance. 
Buy: Expected to outperform the broader market and/or its sector over the next six to 
twelve months.  
Total/Market 
Recommendations is based on a stock's total 
return and/or benchmarked against market 
performance. 
Buy means the stock is expected to appreciate and produce a total return of at least 10% 
and outperform the S&P 500 over the next 12-18 months; 
Sector/Total 
Recommendations is based on a stock's total 
return and/or benchmarked against sector 
performance. 
STRONG BUY–The company has strong fundamentals and/or positive near-term 
catalysts. The stock’s total return is expected to exceed the peer group’s return in the 
industry and/or appreciate 15% or more over the next 12 months; 
Market/Sector/Total 
Recommendations is based on a stock's total 
return and/or benchmarked against market 
and/or sector performance. 
Buy - anticipates appreciation of 10% or more within the next 12 months, and/or a total 
return of 10% including dividend payments,and/or the ability of the shares to perform 
better than the leading stock market averages or stocks within its particular industry 
sector. 
Market/risk 
Recommendation is based on a stock's risk-
adjusted return relative to the market 
performance. 
"Underperform (U) Expected to underperform on a total return, risk-adjusted basis the 
broader U.S. equity market over 
the next 12 months."  
Sector/risk Recommendation is based on a stock's risk-adjusted return relative to sector performance. 
“Stock's total return vs. analyst's coverage on a risk-adjusted basis, for the next 12-18 
months.” 
Total/risk Recommendation is based on a stock's risk-adjusted return. "Based on the stock's total return for the next 12-18 months on a risk-adjusted basis" 
Not sure Cannot identify which benchmark a broker uses. 
"Buy/Add – Buy if you do not own or Add to existing positions. We believe that the 
shares offer an attractive reward versus risk profile over the next 12-18 months given 
current information and defined objectives. Shares seem undervalued based on current 
valuation measures and expectations."  
Changes 
A broker changes the benchmark during our 
sample period and we cannot identify when the 
broker made the change. 
Janney Montgonery Scott LLC used total return benchmark in 2004, and used sector 
benchmark by the end of 2009.   




Table 2. Summary Statistics 
This table presents the summary statistics on the different types of benchmarks.  Only brokerage houses which issued at least 100 
recommendations to US firms during our sample period (9/2002 – 12/2009) are included in the analysis. For each type of benchmark, we report 
the number of brokers using this type of benchmark, the distribution of the number of recommendations issued by each broker, the total number of 
recommendations issued by all brokers and the percentage to the total number of recommendations, and the number of brokers which is amongst 
the biggest 20 brokers in IBES according to the total number of recommendations issued.  
    # of recommendations per broker       
Benchmark 
No. of 
Brokers Mean # rec 25 percentile median 75 percentile Total # rec % of all  
No. of brokers 
amongst 
biggest 20 
Sector 37 2078  332  737  2668  76868 32.81% 9 
Market 34 1230  306  627  1506  41822 17.85% 3 
Total 43 1248  217  733  1467  53676 22.91% 4 
No Data 41 408  164  211  391  16745 7.15% 0 
Sector/Risk 4 2453  694  1081  4212  9810 4.19% 1 
Total/Risk 8 1094  346  1159  1466  8753 3.74% 0 
Market/Risk 2 3307  3103  3307  3511  6614 2.82% 1 
Total/Market 3 2110  340  1626  4363  6329 2.70% 1 
Changes 2 2376  1347  2376  3405  4752 2.03% 0 
Sector/Total 2 2045  359  2045  3730  4089 1.75% 1 
Market/Sector 4 495  392  463  599  1981 0.85% 0  
Not Sure 2 772  685  772  859  1544 0.66% 0  
Market/Sector/Total 1 1291  1291  1291  1291  1291 0.55% 0  
                  






Table 3. Determinants of Benchmarks 
 
This table reports the results of estimating logistic models of the probability of adopting a certain benchmark.  The models are estimated for all 
brokers which use either sector or market or total benchmark and with at least 100 recommendations issued during our sample period (9/2002 – 
12/2009). The dependent variables are as follows: Broker Age is the number of years a broker has appeared in IBES, Broker Size is defined as 
the ratio of the number of recommendations issued by a broker to the total number of recommendations by all brokers in the last year, Number of 
Industries is the number of industries covered by a broker in last year, Analyst Experience is the average  number of days an analyst has 
appeared in IBES at the beginning of each year within a brokerage house, Firm Size is the average market value of equity of all firms covered by 
a broker by the end of last year, BE/ME is the average ratio of book equity to market equity of all firms covered by a broker in last year.  Robust 
standard errors (in parentheses) are calculated after clustering at the broker level. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sector vs. Market or Total Sector vs. Market Sector vs. Total Market vs. Total 
VARIABLES Prob(Benchmark=Sector) Prob(Benchmark=Sector) Prob(Benchmark=Sector) Prob(Benchmark=Market) 
          
Log(1+Broker Age) 0.822* 0.651 1.004* 0.305 
(0.474) (0.569) (0.540) (0.469) 
Broker Size 94.84*** 134.3*** 76.55** -54.74 
(32.87) (51.59) (37.57) (46.62) 
Log(Number of Industries) -0.897*** -1.173*** -0.831** 0.261 
(0.278) (0.400) (0.324) (0.312) 
Log(1+Analyst Experience) -0.163 -0.246 -0.210 0.174 
(0.364) (0.487) (0.453) (0.417) 
Log(Firm Size) 0.101 -0.208 0.268 0.393** 
(0.190) (0.196) (0.219) (0.182) 
Log(1+BE/ME) -0.160 -0.263 -0.0581 0.410 
(0.285) (0.305) (0.346) (0.309) 
Constant -1.265 5.747 -3.271 -8.361** 
(3.952) (4.376) (4.692) (4.108) 
 




Table 4. Organizational Structure of Sell-Side Brokers 
 
This table compares the industry concentration of analysts employed by brokers according to their benchmarks. For each analyst and each year, we 
define industry concentration as the fraction of the analyst’s coverage universe that belongs to her most covered industry. The coverage universe 
of the analyst each year is taken as the set of firms for which the analyst issued recommendations during the year and for which the analyst hold 
outstanding recommendations by the end of the year. Panel A presents the average industry concentration according to the benchmark adopted by 
the analyst by the end of the year. Panel B reports results of yearly OLS regression of industry concentration. Sector takes value of 1 if a broker 
uses sector benchmark and 0 if a broker uses market or total return benchmarks.  # Analysts is the log of the number of analysts employed by the 
analyst’s broker during the year. Coverage is the log of the number of firms in the analyst’s coverage universe in the year. Age is the log of 





Panel A – Univariate Statistics on Industry Concentration 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Sector 80.2% 80.4% 80.3% 80.4% 79.3% 78.8% 79.1% 78.1%
Market 75.3% 76.4% 77.4% 76.3% 76.1% 74.1% 75.9% 78.5%
Total 76.6% 77.0% 77.4% 76.1% 74.9% 73.6% 73.4% 70.6%
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Sector 79.4% 77.9% 80.5% 78.8% 77.4% 75.8% 78.5% 75.7%
Market 74.4% 75.2% 77.1% 75.4% 74.1% 72.6% 73.9% 76.7%
Total 75.5% 73.8% 75.3% 73.1% 72.0% 70.0% 71.7% 68.0%






Table 4. (Continued) 
 
Panel B – Regressions on Industry Concentration 
 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Intercept 0.7836*** 0.8436*** 0.7627*** 0.7730*** 0.8468*** 0.8400*** 0.8595*** 0.8938***
(0.0341)      (0.0333)      (0.0358)      (0.0361)      (0.0382)      (0.0371)      (0.0393)      (0.0445)      
Sector 0.0238**  0.0138       0.0018       0.0139       0.0181*    0.0283*** 0.0275**  0.0210*    
(0.0104)      (0.0103)      (0.0104)      (0.0105)      (0.0108)      (0.0108)      (0.0111)      (0.0116)      
# Analysts 0.0396*** 0.0543*** 0.0507*** 0.0510*** 0.0424*** 0.0453*** 0.0390*** 0.0488***
(0.0055)      (0.0056)      (0.0054)      (0.0056)      (0.0056)      (0.0058)      (0.0066)      (0.0070)      
Coverage 0.7836       -0.0320*** 0.7627       -0.0160*    -0.0360*** -0.0550*** -0.0340*** -0.0520***
(0.0089)      (0.0092)      (0.0094)      (0.0097)      (0.0097)      (0.0097)      (0.0091)      (0.0100)      
Age -0.0230*** -0.0300*** -0.0200*** -0.0230*** -0.0250*** -0.0230*** -0.0270*** -0.0310***
(0.0050)      (0.0046)      (0.0044)      (0.0046)      (0.0047)      (0.0045)      (0.0045)      (0.0048)      
Observations 2,054 2,021 2,054 2,040 2,004 1,948 1,921 1,706
R2 3.0% 7.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 6.0% 4.0% 6.0%
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Intercept 0.7218*** 0.8010*** 0.7989*** 0.6354*** 0.7794*** 0.7599*** 0.8730*** 0.9340***
(0.0533)      (0.0576)      (0.0601)      (0.0705)      (0.0691)      (0.0657)      (0.0670)      (0.0746)      
Sector 0.0177       0.0170       0.0215       0.0132       0.0258*    0.0222       0.0281*    0.0255*    
(0.0127)      (0.0134)      (0.0134)      (0.0143)      (0.0148)      (0.0145)      (0.0151)      (0.0152)      
# Analysts 0.0499*** 0.0607*** 0.0532*** 0.0702*** 0.0396*** 0.0586*** 0.0430*** 0.0556***
(0.0073)      (0.0078)      (0.0075)      (0.0081)      (0.0082)      (0.0087)      (0.0093)      (0.0101)      
Coverage 0.0231       -0.0020       -0.0120       0.0342       -0.0070       -0.0270       -0.0240       -0.0580***
(0.0172)      (0.0193)      (0.0200)      (0.0225)      (0.0215)      (0.0206)      (0.0200)      (0.0217)      
Age -0.0300*** -0.0390*** -0.0290*** -0.0310*** -0.0250*** -0.0280*** -0.0340*** -0.0390***
(0.0067)      (0.0066)      (0.0061)      (0.0069)      (0.0071)      (0.0065)      (0.0059)      (0.0063)      
Observations 1,342 1,192 1,149 1,037 1,087 1,056 1,057 957
R2 4.0% 6.0% 5.0% 8.0% 3.0% 5.0% 6.0% 7.0%
Sample: All Analysts
Sample: Analysts Covering More than 5 Stocks
 
 
Table 5. Distribution of Recommendations 
This table presents the summary statistics on the distribution of recommendations according to the types of benchmarks.  Only brokerage houses 
which issued at least 100 recommendations to US firms during our sample period (9/2002 – 12/2009) are included in the analysis. Summary 
statistics are obtained for each year of the sample. Each observation in a yearly sample is a pair of firm and broker such that the broker has an 
outstanding recommendation for the firm at the end of the year, where an outstanding recommendation is the most recent recommendation issued 
by the broker to the firm during the year and that has not been cancelled by the broker.  Panel A presents for each year of the sample and each type 
of broker, the distribution of the outstanding recommendations at the end of the year, the average recommendation level, and the standard 
deviation of the recommendation level. Panel B presents statistics on the distribution of recommendations summarized by industry. For each year, 
each type of broker, and each industry, we compute the industry range as the difference between the most pessimistic and most optimistic 
outstanding recommendation for the industry. In the computation of the recommendation levels, strong buys and buy are considered optimistic 
recommendations and are mapped to level 1; holds are mapped to level 2; and sells and strong sells are considered pessimistic recommendations 
and are mapped to level 3. 
Panel A – Distribution of Recommendations 
Dec-02 Dec-03 Dec-04 Dec-05 Dec-06 Dec-07 Dec-08 Dec-09
% buy 52% 45% 45% 47% 48% 51% 47% 46%
% hold 43% 49% 49% 47% 47% 45% 48% 49%
% sell 5% 7% 6% 6% 6% 4% 5% 5%
Avg rec 1.32 1.41 1.39 1.38 1.40 1.31 1.37 1.40
Std dev rec 0.94 0.99 0.97 0.94 0.91 0.88 0.92 0.92
% buy 51% 48% 46% 50% 49% 53% 52% 52%
% hold 44% 47% 49% 47% 46% 43% 44% 43%
% sell 5% 5% 5% 4% 5% 4% 5% 6%
Avg rec 1.30 1.35 1.37 1.32 1.33 1.25 1.27 1.24
Std dev rec 0.98 0.94 0.97 0.94 0.95 0.97 1.01 1.05
% buy 37% 38% 39% 42% 40% 42% 40% 42%
% hold 44% 48% 48% 49% 50% 50% 51% 49%
% sell 18% 15% 13% 10% 10% 8% 9% 9%
Avg rec 1.76 1.70 1.65 1.58 1.60 1.57 1.61 1.58














Table 5. (Continued) 
 
Panel B – Industry Characteristics of the Distribution of Recommendations 
Dec-02 Dec-03 Dec-04 Dec-05 Dec-06 Dec-07 Dec-08 Dec-09
# industries 58 59 60 64 67 67 68 68
Average industry range from 
sector benchmarkers 1.83 1.86 1.74 1.72 1.70 1.65 1.70 1.67
Average industry range from 
market benchmarkers 1.51 1.62 1.53 1.53 1.63 1.55 1.46 1.53
Average industry range from 
total benchmarkers 1.58 1.62 1.68 1.54 1.53 1.44 1.50 1.45
% industries with a bigger 
range from sector 28% 25% 12% 22% 18% 31% 28% 31%
% industries with a bigger 
range from market 2% 3% 7% 6% 15% 13% 7% 9%
% industries with a bigger 
range from total benchmarkers 3% 5% 13% 8% 4% 6% 13% 4%
% industries with at least one 
sell from sector benchmarkers 83% 81% 67% 69% 64% 58% 63% 59%
% industries with at least one 
sell from market 50% 56% 53% 50% 55% 48% 38% 46%
% industries with at least one 




Table 6. Logistic Regressions Relating Optimistic/Pessimistic to Different Benchmarks 
 
The table presents results of logistic regressions whose dependent variable equals 1 when a recommendation is either optimistic or pessimistic. 
Our sample period is between 9/2002 and 12/2009. All models use firm fixed effects. Optimistic recommendations are “strong buy” and “buy,” 
and pessimistic recommendations are “underperform” and “sell.” Sector takes value of 1 if a broker uses sector benchmark and 0 if a broker uses 
market or total return benchmarks.  AFF is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the broker issuing the recommendation was a lead underwriter or a 
co-manager in an equity offering for the firm in the 24 months before the recommendation announcement date. SANCT is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if the recommendation is issued by an analyst who is employed by a sanctioned brokerage house. PASTFIRMPERF is the average 
daily stock return over [-180, -2]. PASTMKPERF is the average daily market return over [-180, -2]. Analyst EXPERIENCE is defined as the 
number of days the analyst has appeared in IBES. TIER3 is an indicator variable for whether a brokerage house uses a three-tier recommendation 
grid at the time a recommendation is issued. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) 
  Prob(Rec=OPT) Prob(Rec=PESS) 
Sector -0.198*** 0.469*** 
(0.0122) (0.0228) 
AFF 0.318*** -0.649*** 
(0.0240) (0.0490) 
PASTMKTPERF -2.430 -9.562 
(6.753) (10.31) 
PASTFIRMPERF 42.42*** -52.08*** 
(2.972) (4.403) 
SANCT -0.247*** 0.303*** 
(0.0141) (0.0243) 
EXPERIENCE -0.0179*** 0.0248*** 
(0.00346) (0.00643) 
TIER3 -0.275*** 0.0333 
(0.0127) (0.0230) 
Observations 152,186 131,636 
 
 
Table 7. The Relation Between Recommendations, Earnings Forecasts and LTG Projections 
This table presents average parameter values from running monthly Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions—models (1) and (2)—
of recommendation levels on  measures of analysts’ forecasts regarding earnings and long-term growth (LTG). The observations are monthly firms 
for each month between September 2002 and December 2009. A firm is included in the regression for month t only if the firm has outstanding 
recommendations and outstanding forecasts regarding next annual earnings and forecasts of LTG available at the end of that month. An 
outstanding recommendation (forecast) issued by a broker to a firm at time t is the most recent recommendation (forecast) issued by the broker to 
that firm that is not older than 12 months and that has not been cancelled by the broker. Models (i) and (iii) [(ii) and (iv)] is based on 
recommendations and forecasts issued by sector (market or total)  benchmarkers only.  The dependent variable is the average recommendation 
level among the outstanding recommendations available for the firm at the end of the month. E/P is a score based on the average earnings-price 
ratio forecasts for the firms in the sample, where earnings forecasts are average 1-year ahead annual earnings forecasts and price is the observed 
stock price when earnings data are collected.  AI_LTG and WI_LTG (AI_E/P and WI_E/P) refer respectively to measures of across-industry and 
within-industry expectations of LTG (earnings-price ratio), and are computed as follows. Starting with the LTG forecasts, each month we first 
compute for each firm the consensus LTG as the average LTG forecast amongst the outstanding forecasts available for that firm. We then define 
for each industry an industry LTG forecast as the average LTG consensus across all firms in that industry. Then, for each firm in that month we 
compute the firm’s industry-adjusted LTG forecast as the firm’s LTG forecast minus its industry LTG forecast. We compute WI_LTG as a score 
between 0 and 1 based on the ranking of industry-adjusted LTG forecasts in each industry. For each firm we also calculate an across-industry LTG 
score, denoted as AI_LTG, based on the ranking of the industry LTG forecasts across all industries. Similarly, we calculate the within- and 
across-industry earnings estimate rankings denoted by WI_E/P and AI_E/P respectively, based on the analyst earnings forecast scaled by the stock 
price prevailing when the earnings data are collected. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are calculated using the Fama-MacBeth (1973) 
autocorrelation-adjusted t-statistics. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. The reported R2’s and 




Table 7. (Continued) 
 
 














    
Intercept 2.991*** 2.859*** <0.0001  3.074*** 2.998*** 0.0041 
(0.060) (0.041)   (0.040) (0.039) 
LTG -0.401*** -0.423*** 0.1868  
(0.025) (0.019)   
AI_LTG     -0.183*** -0.264*** 0.0002 
    (0.036) (0.030) 
WI_LTG     -0.349*** -0.344*** 0.6965 
    (0.032) (0.020) 
E/P -0.142** -0.178***  0.0769 
(0.058) (0.041)   
AI_E/P     -0.032* -0.107*** <0.0001 
    (0.017) (0.015) 
WI_E/P     -0.131*** -0.144*** 0.3734 
    (0.030) (0.025) 
    
Observations 1,028 1,425   1,028 1,425 




Table 8. Distribution of Recommendation Targets 
This table summarizes the distribution of buy recommendation targets for market, sector and total return 
benchmarkers in our sample. For market (or sector) benchmarkers, a buy recommendation target is 
defined as the ‘x’ percent return a stock is expected to outperform the market (or sector) performance. For 
total return benchmarkers, a buy recommendation target is defined as the ‘x’ percent total return a stock is 
expected to achieve. 
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Table 9. Univariate Analysis of Achieving the Targets 
This table presents results on whether a recommendation target has been achieved by comparing the 
performance of stocks recommendations with analysts’ recommendation targets during the period of the 
recommendation day and the upgrade/downgrade date of the stock recommendation. Panel A reports the 
fraction of stock recommendations which achieved the targets. For sector/market benchmarkers, 
achieving targets means a buy (or sell) recommendation earned a cumulative return higher (or lower) than 
the sum of industry/market return and the buy (or sell) target return.  For total benchmarkers, achieving 
targets means a buy (or sell) recommendation earned a cumulative return higher (or lower) than the buy 
(or sell) target return.  Panel B reports the magnitude by which analysts beat (or miss) their targets.  It is 
calculated as the difference between cumulative stock return and the target return.   Panel C reports the 








 Buy   Sell 
  Total no. of recs 
No. of recs which hit 
the target Total no. of recs 
No. of recs which hit 
the target 
Sector 13,021 50.2% 4,929 58.2% 
Market  9,392 52.9% 1,866 56.8% 
Total 13,271 39.0% 1,763 35.8% 




     
Panel B 
 
 Mean Median   Mean Median 
Sector 0.0325 0.0011   -0.0294 -0.0377 
t-statistics 10.13   -5.18  
Market  0.0574 0.0157  -0.0167 -0.0347 
t-statistics 13.79   -1.68  
Total -0.0491 -0.0839  0.1260 0.0928 
t-statistics -11.09     11.15   
      
Overall 0.0087 -0.0205   0.0054 -0.0166 
       
t-statistics      
Sector vs. 
Market 4.81   1.15  
Sector vs. 
Total 14.88   13.34  
Market vs. 





  Buy  Sell 
  Mean Median   Mean Median 
Sector 0.1057 0.0762 0.0182 -0.0101 
Market  0.1107 0.0778 -0.0088 -0.0339 
Total 0.0981 0.0612   -0.0122 -0.0373 
Overall 0.1042 0.0714   0.0060 -0.0208 
t-statistics 
Sector vs. 
Market 0.8493 2.1070 
Sector vs. 
Total 1.3076 2.3345 
Market 
vs. Total 1.9431     0.2214   
 
 
Table 10. Multivariate Analysis of Achieving the Targets 
 
The table presents the results of analyzing the performance of buy/sell recommendations issued by market/industry/total return benchmarkers 
during the period of the recommendation day and the upgrade/downgrade date of the stock recommendation for our sample period of 9/2002 and 
12/2009. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the difference between the cumulative stock return and the target return.  In Panel B, the dependent 
variable is the raw return.  Control variables are as follows. Market (or Total) takes value of 1 if a broker uses market (or total) benchmark and 0 
if a broker uses other benchmarks. PastFirmPerformance is the average daily stock return over [-180, -2]. PastMarketPerformance is the 
average daily market return over [-180, -2]. Analyst’s Experience is the number of days an analyst has appeared in IBES. Broker Size is defined 
as the ratio of the number of recommendations issued by a broker to the total number of recommendations by all brokers in the last year. Firm 
Size is the market value of equity measured 30 days prior to the recommendation day, BE/ME is the ratio of book equity to market equity in the 
last year.  Q1, Q2, Q3 and Q4 indicate a broker’s favorableness quintiles.  For buys and holds, quintiles are determined each quarter by ranking 
brokers in ascending order according to the percentage of recommendations which are buys by the end of previous quarter.  For sells, quintiles are 
determined each quarter by ranking brokers in ascending order according to the percentage of recommendations which are sells by the end of last 
quarter.  Q5 is omitted from the regressions due to the multicolinearity problem.  Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the broker 
level. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 






Table 10. (Continued) 
 
Panel A  
 
  Buy Recommendations   Sell Recommendations 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 0.0325*** 0.2833*** 0.2825*** -0.0294*** -0.1006 -0.0805 
(0.0103) (0.0606) (0.0599) (0.0097) (0.0901) (0.0890) 
Market  0.0249* 0.0283* 0.0286* 0.0128 0.0086 0.0106 
(0.0146) (0.0163) (0.0150) (0.0174) (0.0169) (0.0165) 
Total -0.0815*** -0.0860*** -0.0767*** 0.1554*** 0.1573*** 0.1543*** 
(0.0218) (0.0271) (0.0226) (0.0253) (0.0260) (0.0242) 
PastFirmPerformance -2.5264 -2.3126 -7.7170** -7.6637** 
(1.8057) (1.8055) (3.1237) (3.1288) 
PastMarketPerformance -13.0643*** -13.4814*** -17.4322*** -17.6048*** 
(4.3937) (4.1792) (6.4638) (6.3905) 
Log(1+Analysts' 
Experience) 0.0016 0.0015 -0.0116** -0.0117** 
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0052) (0.0053) 
Broker Size 1.1104 0.6328 -0.4024 -0.2177 
(1.0570) (1.0777) (0.7188) (0.7489) 
Firm Size -0.0219*** -0.0232*** 0.0074 0.0078 
(0.0040) (0.0038) (0.0050) (0.0050) 
Log(1+BE/ME) 0.1042*** 0.1014*** 0.1161*** 0.1173*** 
(0.0178) (0.0177) (0.0231) (0.0233) 
Q1 0.0420* -0.0398 
(0.0218) (0.0294) 
Q2 0.0163 -0.0090 
(0.0105) (0.0146) 
Q3 0.0114** -0.0124 
(0.0053) (0.0084) 
Q4 0.0090* -0.0106 
(0.0052) (0.0068) 
Observations 35,684 35,684 35,684 8,558 8,558 8,558 









  Buy Recommendations   Sell Recommendations 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
                
Constant 0.1057*** 0.3870*** 0.3868*** 0.0182 0.0457 0.0690 
(0.0081) (0.0483) (0.0483) (0.0153) (0.1034) (0.1023) 
Market  0.0050 0.0063 0.0081 -0.0268 -0.0325 -0.0376 
(0.0120) (0.0152) (0.0153) (0.0234) (0.0292) (0.0290) 
Total -0.0076 -0.0151 -0.0088 -0.0304 -0.0305 -0.0434 
(0.0123) (0.0158) (0.0149) (0.0248) (0.0322) (0.0287) 
PastFirmPerformance -0.3098 -0.1880 -6.2466* -6.1715* 
(1.8269) (1.8071) (3.5223) (3.5121) 
PastMarketPerformance -19.6656*** -19.9154*** -28.6525*** -28.7281*** 
(4.9153) (4.8802) (7.8940) (8.0034) 
Log(1+Analysts' 
Experience) -0.0010 -0.0011 -0.0157*** -0.0155*** 
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0054) (0.0054) 
Broker Size 0.9325 0.6831 -0.4125 -0.0179 
(0.8392) (0.9559) (1.1800) (1.3388) 
Firm Size -0.0232*** -0.0239*** 0.0025 0.0034 
(0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0052) (0.0054) 
Log(1+BE/ME) 0.1371*** 0.1352*** 0.1203*** 0.1240*** 
(0.0173) (0.0170) (0.0274) (0.0273) 
Q1 0.0247 -0.0520 
(0.0275) (0.0418) 
Q2 0.0062 -0.0278 
(0.0129) (0.0186) 
Q3 0.0066 -0.0127 
(0.0066) (0.0100) 
Q4 0.0024 -0.0107 
(0.0049) (0.0072) 
Observations 35,684 35,684 35,684 8,558 8,558 8,558 




Table 11.  Three-Day Price Reactions to Recommendations 
This table presents results on the three-day price reactions to recommendations issued by brokers with different benchmarks during our sample 
period of 9/2002 and 12/2009.  Panel A reports the univariate tests on three-day price reactions.  Panel B reports results on the cross-sectional 
regressions.  Sector takes value of 1 if a broker uses sector benchmark and 0 if a broker uses market or total return benchmarks. 
PastFirmPerformance is the average daily raw stock return over [-180, -2]. PastMarketPerformance is the average daily market return over [-
180, -2]. Analyst’s Experience is the number of days an analyst has appeared in the IBES. Broker Size is defined as the ratio of the number of 
recommendations issued by a broker to the total number of recommendations by all brokers in the last year. Firm Size is the market value of 
equity measured 30 days prior to the recommendation day. BE/ME is the ratio of book equity to market equity in the last year.  Q1, Q2, Q3 and 
Q4 indicate a broker’s favorableness quintiles.  For buys (or sells), quintiles are determined each quarter by ranking brokers in ascending order 
according to the percentage of recommendations which are buys (or sells) by the end of previous quarter.  Q5 is omitted from the regressions due 
to the multicolinearity problem.  All regression models use firm and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the 
firm level. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Univariate Tests 
  Buys   Sells 













Sector 15624 0.032419 0.031758 0.030115 5745 -0.048863 -0.049303 -0.047736 
Market 12392 0.029693 0.028824 0.027509 2708 -0.051403 -0.052433 -0.052068 





Table 11. (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Short-Term Reaction Regressions – Buy Recommendations 
  Market Adjusted Return   Industry Adjusted Return   Total Return 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
                
Market 0.0021** 0.0017* 
(0.0010) (0.0010) 
Sector  0.0010 -0.0006 
(0.0008) (0.0009) 
Total -0.0020** -0.0005 
(0.0010) (0.0010) 
PastFirmPerformance -2.0611*** -2.0627*** -1.8682*** -1.8616*** -1.9464*** -1.9459*** 
(0.3544) (0.3541) (0.3445) (0.3444) (0.3645) (0.3642) 
PastMarketPerformance 4.5874*** 4.5722*** 4.4461*** 4.4275*** 2.6524*** 2.6395*** 
(0.7355) (0.7354) (0.7126) (0.7122) (0.7789) (0.7793) 
Log(1+Analysts' Experience) 0.0019*** 0.0019*** 0.0018*** 0.0018*** 0.0018*** 0.0018*** 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Broker Size 0.5565*** 0.4124*** 0.4897*** 0.3618*** 0.5224*** 0.4029*** 
(0.0392) (0.0420) (0.0380) (0.0395) (0.0402) (0.0436) 
Firm Size -0.0403*** -0.0404*** -0.0387*** -0.0389*** -0.0401*** -0.0402*** 
(0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0044) 
Log(1+BM) 0.0041 0.0037 0.0034 0.0029 0.0047 0.0043 
(0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0119) (0.0119) 
q1 0.0101*** 0.0109*** 0.0092*** 
(0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0018) 
q2 0.0051*** 0.0054*** 0.0051*** 
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
q3 0.0024*** 0.0026*** 0.0022*** 
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
q4 0.0019*** 0.0020*** 0.0019*** 
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Constant 0.5542*** 0.5527*** 0.5343*** 0.5334*** 0.5511*** 0.5491*** 
(0.0630) (0.0631) (0.0626) (0.0627) (0.0637) (0.0638) 
Observations 46,604 46,604 46,604 46,604 46,604 46,604 





Table 11. (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Short-Term Reaction Regressions – Sell Recommendations 
  Market Adjusted Return   Industry Adjusted Return   Total Return 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
                
Market 0.0008 0.0025 
(0.0026) (0.0028) 
Sector  0.0005 -0.0023 
(0.0022) (0.0026) 
Total -0.0013 -0.0000 
(0.0028) (0.0029) 
PastFirmPerformance 1.1522* 1.2109* 1.3504** 1.3959** 1.2914* 1.3443* 
(0.7003) (0.6993) (0.6733) (0.6724) (0.7087) (0.7076) 
PastMarketPerformance 6.1448*** 6.1347*** 4.9171*** 4.9164*** 4.3649** 4.3531** 
(1.6772) (1.6815) (1.5872) (1.5914) (1.8062) (1.8075) 
Log(1+Analysts' Experience) -0.0037*** -0.0037*** -0.0031*** -0.0031*** -0.0039*** -0.0039*** 
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Broker Size -0.2172** -0.2797*** -0.2320*** -0.2680*** -0.2699*** -0.3146*** 
(0.0859) (0.0892) (0.0848) (0.0862) (0.0927) (0.0957) 
Firm Size -0.0103** -0.0105** -0.0083* -0.0085** -0.0099** -0.0101** 
(0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0048) (0.0048) 
Log(1+BM) -0.0116 -0.0121 -0.0108 -0.0112 -0.0099 -0.0102 
(0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0107) (0.0106) (0.0115) (0.0114) 
q1 -0.0028 -0.0037 -0.0002 
(0.0055) (0.0054) (0.0058) 
q2 -0.0071*** -0.0066*** -0.0066*** 
(0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0018) 
q3 -0.0027*** -0.0027*** -0.0023** 
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) 
q4 -0.0028*** -0.0025*** -0.0026*** 
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007) 
Constant 0.1274* 0.1382** 0.0952 0.1072* 0.1260* 0.1344* 
(0.0660) (0.0659) (0.0622) (0.0619) (0.0694) (0.0692) 
Observations 11,472 11,472 11,472 11,472 11,472 11,472 




Figure 1. End-of-Month Distribution of Outstanding Recommendations 
This table presents, for each month between September 2002 and December 2009, the fraction of buys and fraction sells among the outstanding 
recommendations issued by market, total, and sector benchmarkers. Only brokerage houses which issued at least 100 recommendations to US 
firms during our sample period (9/2002 – 12/2009) are included in the analysis. 
 
 
 
